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AUSTERITY  WARS
The Crisis of Financialization and the
Struggle for Democracy
Jaime Palomera
Austerity politics  constitute  by no  means  an  innovation.
The neo-classical codes from which they draw inspiration
have regulated the institutional architecture of the European
Union for decades, creating an ideal framework for the rise
of financial capitalism. Although often presented as a
depoliticized set of ‘technical’ norms, they have con- tributed
decisively to shaping the process of continental integration
and redefining class relations across regions. In short,
austerity has provided the normative scaffolding for the
European division of labor under finance capital.
However, financialization has recently entered a pro- longed
crisis, with no avenues for  growth  looming  in the horizon.
In the current context, the deepening of austerity politics can
only translate into an undisguised process of dispossession
(similar to structural adjustment programs implemented in the
Global South) and a challenge to the social contract that
sustained   the   political and economic regime of the EU in
previous decades. This is nowhere clearer than in the
peripheral countries of Southern Europe, where millions of
people have risen up over recent years to push history in a
different direction.In this chapter, I turn to Spain in order to
cast light on the class relations behind austerity politics and
the broad democratic movement striving to transform them—
from that extraordinary outburst called the 15-M Movement
to the birth of the political party Podemos.
A Financial Regime of Accumulation (1977–2007)
Austerity has become a buzzword as of late, but the kind of
economic policies that characterize it began to take shape
during the last great crisis 40 years ago. By the mid- 1970s,
the system of international mechanisms that had supported
capital accumulation in the preceding decades began to fall
apart. The emergence of new actors in the world system
increased competition and led to a problem of industrial
overcapacity that has persisted up to the current era, as
carefully demonstrated by Brenner (2006). However, the
fundamental factor behind the acceleration of the crisis was
the challenge posed by the labor move- ment, which was
robustly organized around the factory system. Wages boomed
comparatively faster than pro- ductivity, substantially
reducing profit rates,1 and capital owners reacted by
increasing prices—a vicious zero-sum game that sent
inflation levels through the roof. In sum, intense class
conflict posed serious obstacles, not only to the continuity of
Spain’s dictatorial regime, but also to capitalism itself (see
Balfour 1994; López Hernández and Rodríguez López 2010).
The resolution to that crisis can be easily   characterized as a
first exercise in austerity politics, granted by a class
compromise between the institutional forces of the Francoist
regime and the Left that crystallized in 1977. In the name of
‘competitiveness’, the government adopted a set of monetarist
measures that tackled inflation and as a  result pushed wages
downward.2 Salaries went from playing a central role in the
overall economy (and a powerful source of social promotion)
to becoming mere production costs. Supported by the now
familiar rhetoric of   ‘sacri- fice’, the burden of the crisis was
placed  on  the  shoul- ders of the most vulnerable sectors. The
horizon of full employment disappeared in favor of corporate
surpluses, and the workers movement embarked on a slow
process of decomposition.
This new brand of policymaking came hand in  hand with the
gradual transformation and repositioning of the Spanish
economy in the new international order. Integra- tion into the
European Union was predicated on the shift from a Fordist
regime of accumulation (articulated around manufacturing
and economies of scale) to a financialized model (centered
on the capture of global financial rents and harnessed by
real   estate   development).   Tellingly, from the early 1980s,
the European Economic Community (EEC) put an end to
industrial subsidies. Instead, it lav- ishly funded huge
infrastructural programs, which played a central role in
feeding the financial and real estate bubbles of  1986–1992
and   1997–2007.3 Financialization was also fundamental in
offsetting the regional imbal- ances between the exporting
Northern European countries and the importing Mediterranean
regions. Trade surpluses amassed in the core were reinvested
in the periphery in the form of debt bonds and mortgage-
backed securities.4
Most importantly, the advance of austerity politics was
predicated on a transfer of social entitlements (attained
between the 1970s and 1980s) from the public to the pri- vate
sphere. From the signing of the Maastricht Treaty up through
the financial crises of 1997–2007, Spanish governments
behaved as the best pupil of austerity proponents,5 keeping
public debt in  check.  However,  they  could  do so  only  by
shifting  collective  obligations  to  the  private domain of the
corporation and the household. The dogma of public debt
reduction, with its limiting effects on social expenditures,
came together   with   a   vast  liberalization of the financial
sector. Guaranteeing one’s own welfare through the mortgage
market became the new thing for the average citizen. The
capacity of households to access resources was less ensured
by their real  income,  which was in decline, than by the
financial revaluation of their properties and the ensuing
capacity to access credit— wealth effects that were
guaranteed as long as the bubble continued.6 This was the
magic that sustained aspirations of social mobility for a vast
majority of the population. It was the ideological glue that
held the middle-class dream together and supported the
growth of oligarchies in the construction and banking
sectors.
Zero-Sum Games (2008–2016)
When the bubble burst in 2007, the financial   dynamics that
had hitherto sustained wealth effects triggered the opposite
trend. The value of properties in the hands of families
plummeted. Homes became liabilities rather than assets, and
debts were now hardly repayable.
The economic meltdown had an even worse impact on the
balance sheets of banks, but the financial oligarchies
embedded in the ‘troika’7 managed to turn the systemic cri- sis
into an opportunity for creating new areas of profit—in short,
for their own reproduction. First, following the idea that
banks were ‘too big to fail’, states poured public funds into
the financial system and took up a colossal amount of toxic
assets.8 Second, in the name of budget deficit reduction,
peripheral countries were forced to  dismantle and privatize
their welfare systems while financing their sovereign debt
through derivative markets. In the process,  a European
problem of private debt was socialized, con- tained within
the borders of the peripheral countries, and turned into a
lucrative niche for financial institutions.9
The combination of austerity and financial expropria-
tion10 constitutes an inherent response to structural limi-
tations in the traditional mechanisms of accumulation:
industrial overcapacity, stagnant productivity, and falling
rates of profit. Against this backdrop, the temporary ‘solu-
tion’ to the crisis can only take the form of a zero-sum
game, whereby the gains of a class imply absolute losses
for vast social groups. In Southern Europe, with the bulk of
the population knee-deep in debt, the possibility of fueling
new  booms  and  extending  household  loans  on a wide
scale to compensate for low wages (and sustain living
standards) cannot even be fathomed. Financial capitalism will
survive only as long as it can resort to outright extractions of
social wealth through mechanisms that have long been
practiced in the Global South—that is, measures carried
out by plutocratic governments that have little to do with
the laws of the ‘free market’.11
In other words, the current crisis is not simply the end to
just another cycle of growth, but  a  poignant  revelation that
promises of social reproduction cannot be kept anymore for
wide segments of the population. Spain is as devastated as
the many unfinished buildings  and  towns dotting its
landscape: the unemployment rate is structurally located at
20 percent;12 around 40 percent of the population scrape by
with wages that oscillate  between 400 and 900 euros; almost
one in three people live at risk of poverty; and hundreds of
thousands have been evicted from their homes since 2007.13
In spite of their resilience, dreams of progress and modernity
linked to the European project are slowly collapsing, like a
house of cards. Cur- rently, very few (a meager 26 percent
in 2016) believe in the much-touted ‘economic recovery’.14
A Democratic Revolution without 
a Revolutionary Subject
We are living through turbulent times. In recent years,
millions of people across Southern Europe have risen up
against the tyranny of austerity around a unanimous call
for ‘democracy’. The current cycle of struggles is indelibly
marked by the eruption of the 15-M Movement in Spain,
also known as the Indignados Movement and Take the
Square. Beginning on 15 May 2011, a week before  the
local and regional elections scheduled for 22 May, these
movements shook up  the  views  of  different  generations of
Spaniards in ways that are still difficult to measure today.
“They do not represent us,” shouted the massive assemblies.
“Join the #Spanishrevolution,” read tweets that helped
boost the demonstrations.  “It’s  not   a   crisis: it’s the
system,” chanted the millions who over a matter of weeks
took over hundreds of public squares across the country.
Without a doubt, the 15-M was much more than a merely
defensive  reaction  against  austerity  measures. It amounted
to no less than a massive indictment of the political-
economic order and a call for a democratic radicalization
of the state.
Of course, the struggle for democracy in Europe is not
at all new. Its history goes back a long way and is sutured
by several episodes of radicalization (Rodríguez 2013). It
emerged as the central fight of the Left between the
Revolutions of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871,
always as a synonym for the  eradication  of  exploitation.
Later on, it was retrieved by the cycle of protests of 1968,
as a critique of twentieth-century socialism and its
bureaucratic structures, and it has now resurfaced again. In
ways that re-enact previous struggles, the 15-M by and
large framed the democratic struggle as a radical
distribution of power, which should necessarily lead to a
distribution of wealth.  While some of its militants came
from existing leftist groups, one of the strategic successes
of the 15-M was the rejection of party affiliations and
traditional symbols of the Left as a way to reach out to a
broad social majority (“This is neither left nor right—it’s
the ones below against the ones above”). The support that
its transformative program amassed (72 percent of the
population) would have been unimaginable not long ago.15
Moreover, by strengthening networks among bottom-up
initiatives, in 2011–2013 the movement was capable of
catalyzing a  wave  of  protests not seen since the 1970s—
actions of civil disobedience to reclaim social rights
(homes, health, schools, culture, pub- lic services) and
attempt to promote spaces of autonomy.
However, the state is currently not receptive to any internal
reforms, as the indignados have exposed. Every new round
of austerity measures confirmed that negotia- tion was not
even a possibility, rendering the institutional system—from
bipartisanship to the monarchy, from finan- cial oligarchies to
the   main   unions—more  illegitimate. As suggested above,
austerity measures go against any possible growth strategies
due to structural limitations and the reproductive needs of
finance capital. The rigidity encountered by the Take the
Square movement reveals that, unlike previous eras, the current
conjuncture  does not  even allow for ideological  discussions
about  revolution and reform. Rather, it boils down to either
revolution or absolute involution, which the rise of far-right
politi- cians is already announcing. Like an army of
scaremongers, the fascists of the world are engineering new
forms of discrimination and fostering ‘wars’ among the poor.
It has come to a point where the choice is between that or a
radically progressive transformation.
In fact, if the crisis of representation and the surge of
corruption (resulting from power struggles among the elites)
have not resulted in the rise of a Spanish Le Pen or Trump, it
is to a great extent because the 15-M not only rejected the
established elites but also aspired to a new, egalitarian
social order. While it spurned the traditional revolutionary
method—namely,   military    insurrection— it employed
different forms of symbolic violence, like “Occupy Congress”
in September 2012. By the end of the following year, the
expression ‘regime crisis’ had become as familiar among
activists as that of ‘constituent process’. In spite of the many
perspectives, there was a growing sense that some kind of
mass party movement would be required in order to replace
Congress with a constituent assembly—one that could draft a
popular constitution disarticulating, at least temporarily, the
instituted powers of the financial oligarchies.16
Paradoxically, the greatest shortcoming of the so-called
democratic revolution up to the present day is the lack of a
revolutionary subject. This has to do with its peculiar class
composition. In spite of its scope,17 the current cycle has been
symbolically represented and materially led by the emerging
figure of the university precariat (34.6 per- cent of the
population).18 After all, the 15-M was also an expression of
the crisis of the middle class as an ideological project. Its
mechanisms of reproduction have collapsed to the point that—
for over 20 years—the regime has not even been able to
integrate the most educated segments into its own structures
(industrial cultures, academia, urban planning, etc.). Current
organizers have had trouble generating the kind of alliances
with subaltern groups that would amount to anything like a
class formation process in the classic sense (Thompson 1963).
Meanwhile, any remaining traces of the working-class
subjectivity that crystallized in the 1970s have practically
vanished.
The weak presence of proletarian and manual laborers in
the movement—that huge 43.4 percent of the Spanish
population  with  lower  secondary  education  attainment,
according to INE (2015)—denotes a severe limitation in terms
of democratic potential and of the political agenda that the
movement can put forth. In fact, this ‘middle-classism’ is at
the basis of an ongoing temptation—notorious in Podemos
and other recent parties—to read the demands of the 15-M
from a conservative angle, allegedly in the name of convincing
the ‘moderate voter’. The keyword is ‘regeneration’: a
renovation of the political elites, a timid return to Keynesian
solutions, and a war on corruption.
Still, if the emergence of Podemos in 2014 carried
great promise, it is especially because  it  had  the  poten-
tial to reverse the class bias. Although the party’s
purple platform was spawned by a group of highly
trained—yet precarious—university activists, it  showed
the  capacity to raise hopes precisely where the
indignados had been almost non-existent:  the  old  red
belts  and  their  hard-hit neighborhoods. Podemos burst
onto the public arena with audacious appearances in
prime time television shows and a down-to-earth
rhetoric that managed to seduce the uni- versity
graduate and the domestic worker alike. Its ambitious
program, inspired by the demands of the indignados,
called for a political and economic democracy, including
debt restructuring, basic income, and the socialization
of key economic sectors. After Podemos’s formidable
suc- cess in the  European  elections  of  May  2014,
thousands of Spaniards who had never been politically
involved— unemployed people, working poor, and
ethnic minorities— flocked to its círculos (circles), the
popular assemblies that mushroomed across the country.
Working-class Spain had not seen anything like it in a
long time.
However, the steps that the organization has taken
since then have so far wasted its great possibilities.
First, the prime movers of the project turned the
primary elec- tion system into a plebiscite about their
own team rather than a truly open process that could
ensure the formation of  plural  candidacies.  As  a  result,
the  movement  quickly shifted into what the 15-M had
wanted to fend off: a verti- cal party with a small
apparatus concentrating most of the power, focused on
defusing internal disagreement and on distributing
positions of privilege. This dynamic was rep- licated in
every region and municipality. The new ‘citizen
councils’ were formed on the basis of loyalty ties to
the apparatus rather than bottom-up processes of
deliberation. Second,  and  most  importantly,  Podemos
has   so   far disregarded  its   own  circles—precisely
those   spaces   that involve the chance of producing
democracy (and building a political culture) where it is
more desperately needed. During the campaign, the
party’s grassroots amounted to little  more  than  ‘shock
troops’.   At   most,   they   were   perceived as entities
expressing demands, never as decision- making bodies.
Any actions and debates in neighborhoods and   towns
were  disconnected  from  the  organization  or stifled by
it. Instead, the leadership chose to concentrate all   of
its   energies   on   building   an   ‘electoral   machine’.
And what was its unifying thread? A populist premise
— namely,  that   the   formation   of   a   common
political   subjectivity   and   hegemony,  which   Errejón
calls   ‘building   a people’ (see Errejón and Mouffe
2015), would be achieved through a powerful narrative,
charismatic leadership, and a fast seizure of state
power. In fact, even among those closest to power,
political debates were absent, replaced instead by
boardroom intrigues and quarrels among ‘families’ over
the distribution of power.
The outcome of this strategy is well known. In spite
of Podemos’s significant irruption in the Spanish
Parliament after the general elections of December
2015, its results are clearly below its original
expectations19 and those of the 15-M. Meanwhile, the
initial enthusiasm  shared  by the party’s grassroots has
somewhat faded. Unable to participate in the decision-
making process and devoid of  political orientation, they
have either dissolved or survived thanks to their most
persistent members.
But all hope is not lost. Podemos is a very young
organization, and its current crisis opens up new
possibilities, even if only small. On the one hand,
different factions within the party are currently
struggling—against many obstacles—to redefine
Podemos’s global strategy, pushing it to abandon the
populist hypothesis and to retrieve the organizational
culture of the 15-M. On the other hand, different
grassroots organizations have lately been emerging and
growing outside the realm of the party system, giving
shape to new forms of counterpower that will be
crucial in prolonging the current political cycle. With
the gradual disintegration of the middle-class horizon
and the advance of precarity, new forms of unionism
are emerging that involve all sorts of struggles—those of
chambermaids, street vendors, musicians, and tenants, to
name but a few. The capacity of civil society to self-
organize and to exert critical pressure on the parties
that have entered the institutional system will surely
play a crucial role in extending the claims for real
democracy in the years to come.
Epilogue
Spain is only a province in the European Union, a
highly integrated region governed by financial
oligarchies. The struggle against austerity cannot prosper
unless it is articulated on that scale. Pan-European
experiments calling for a ‘democratic rebellion’, such as
the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25)
or   Plan   B   for   Europe,  point in the right direction,
yet they face the same problem as Podemos. Without
the backing of grassroots organizations that are powerful
enough to strive for a true redistribution of wealth, they
will be unable to confront the instituted  powers and
will end up participating in processes of elite
replacement. This assumption is not arbitrary but
based on fact: no democratic gains in the history of
Europe have been obtained without forms of class
struggle that made them inevitable. The extension of
political and social rights has always derived from
organized working-class movements, articulated through
alliances that involved different segments of society,
from the radical bourgeoisie to the proletariat.
The great obstacle is that while austerity politics
have accelerated the crisis of the middle class as an
ideological project, planting the seeds for a new era
of conflict, the revolutionary subject capable of pushing
it  forward has yet to  emerge.  Certainly,  most  of  our
imagination is still captured by the memory of the
post-war factory and the aura of the relatively
homogeneous working- class subject who emerged  with
it.   However,  we  might be able to find more answers
to our current predicament in the changing reality of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a period  that
Thompson (1978)   characterizes as one of ‘class
struggle without class’. The English historian
describes a long process through which an infinite
variety of kinds of work and subjective experiences
came together through social organizations and
movements. His political subject was formed out of a
variety of alliances among different social positions
rather than from a more or less common experience.
The challenge today is perhaps greater than back then,
given the national borders that divide the peoples of
the continent. Yet it is a challenge that we cannot
escape.
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Notes
1. Between 1969 and 1979, the profit rate shrank from 30
percent to 12 percent of the social product (Nieto
Ferrández 2007).
2. In October 1977, the main political forces, including
the Com- munist Party and the Socialist Party, signed a
treaty through which they defined the new political-
economic framework, fol- lowing the guidelines of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Develop- ment (OECD)
(Etxezarreta 1991). Arguably, the most important
element in this document was the decision to control
inflation by  adopting   (1)   a   monetarist   policy
(monetarist  restrictions) and (2) an income policy (wage
restraint). It was agreed that, from then on, wage levels
would be subordinated to expected inflation, thereby
reversing the previous wage indexing system, whereby
salaries were set in relation to past inflation levels.
3. For more details on these financial developments, see
Etxezarreta (1991), Naredo (1996), and, in particular, the
key work of López Hernández and Rodríguez López
2010).
4. This was a precarious but crucial mechanism after the
estab- lishment of the euro, which made it impossible
for peripheral countries to rely on currency devaluation—
a traditional way of making their exports more
competitive vis-à-vis the core coun- tries (Aglietta and
Brand 2014; Lapavitsas 2012).
5. The rate  of  public  debt as a  proportion  of  GDP in
Spain  was consistently below 60 percent (as stipulated
by the Maastricht Treaty) until 2008 and only began to
increase with the finan- cial crisis. This took place
fundamentally as a result of the bailout program, which
turned private debt into government debt in what
constituted a classic socialization of corporate losses—
from 40.17 percent in 2008 up to 98.64 percent in 2014,
representing a level of growth of 146 percent. In 2015,
the rate of public debt with respect to GDP rose again,
by 5 percent.
6. Prior to the financial crisis, 87.1 percent of the housing
stock was privately owned, and its price increased by
more than 180 percent between 1998 and 2008 (EMF
2008; INE 2011). The figures are staggering. Compare,
for instance, with another extremely financialized market
such as the US, where real estate prices increased by 104
percent, according to Freddie Mac’s  Conventional
Mortgage   Home   Price   Index   (CMHPI). See
http://www.freddiemac.com/r  esear  ch/indices/house-price-   
index.html.
7. The term ‘troika’ (‘group of three’ in Russian) is used to
describe the European Commission, the IMF, and the
European Central Bank (ECB)—the three supra-national
institutions in charge of dictating austerity measures in
exchange for bailouts (or the promise of bailouts),
especially for peripheral European states such as
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece.
8. Sareb, the ‘bad bank’ that the Spanish government
created in agreement with the troika, acquired bad loans
estimated at around 80 billion euros.
9. The normative impossibility of the ECB  to  act  as  a
lender  of last resort—as the Federal Reserve did in the
US, guaranteeing the bonds issued by different states—
has generated several panic waves in the financial
markets in 2011–2014, making government debts   an
easy  target  for speculative  attacks. The crisis was so
deep in the summer of 2014 that the European
Commission was forced to partly betray its austerity
principles by lowering interest rates in the face of
potential deflation and massively purchasing toxic asset–
backed securities  (Aglietta and Brand 2014).
10.To get a very superficial sense of what can be rightly
called a ‘financial government’, one need only look at
the size of global financial assets (typically between four
and six times  bigger than the world’s GDP), or compare
the power of corporate groups versus nation-states in
Europe. For instance, the total value of Santander Bank’s
assets is above Spain’s GDP.
11.Public debt, among others, was in fact defined by Marx
([1867] 1990) as one of the characteristic forms of
primitive accumula- tion through which European powers
extracted wealth from their colonies.
12.In 2013, up to 6 million people (27 percent) registered
as unemployed. The present reduction in the
unemployment rate does not mean that more people
are employed. Rather, fewer registered people  are
actively  looking  for  a  job.  See  Encuesta de población
activa (EPA), Instituto Nacional de Estadística, at
http://www.ine.es. 
13.No accurate data exist on the actual number of
evictions, but different groups—such as the grassroots
organization Plataforma de Afectados por las Hipotecas
(PAH, Platform for People Affected by Mortgages) and
Amnesty International—estimate that the figure could be
around 600,000 in 2007–2015.
14.See the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)
survey of January  2016,  http://www.cis.es/. 
15.According to a Metroscopia survey, in May 2014 (three
years after the inception of 15-M), 72 percent of the
population sup- ported the 15-M’s main claims. See
http://metr  oscopia.org/.   
16.The  idea  of a  constituent  process  was  indirectly
informed  by the Latin American experiences (in Ecuador
and Bolivia) in the wake of structural adjustment
programs, although there was ample critique of the
presidentialist turn they had ended up taking and
discussions about the paradoxical need for a strong,
coercive state in order to defend social conquests from
the attacks of oligarchic powers.
17.According to Metroscopia, between 1 and 6 million
people claimed to have participated in the public squares. 
18.Meanwhile, the participation of segments with low
education (40 percent of Spaniards do not finish
secondary  education) was relatively absent.
19.Polls between November 2014 and February 2015
showed that Podemos was in a favorable position to win
the elections, being predicted to outpoll the two main
parties—the Socialist Party and the Popular Party.
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